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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, • 
• 
Plaintiff-Respondent, • 
• 
-v- • Case No • 18080 • 
CHARLES L. CRICK, • • 
Defendant-Appellant. • 
• 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Charles L. Crick, was charged with 
second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-203 (1973), as amended, and was tried 
before a jury in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury found appellant guilty of seco~d-degree 
::' 
murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate 
term in- the Utah State Prison of not less than five years, and 
which may be for life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirrnance of appellant's 
conviction and sentence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Samuel Beare was murdered on March 15, 1981~ at 
approximately 2:00 a.m. (T. 3, 241). On March 13, 1981, 
following marital disagreements, the victim moved into an 
apartment occupied by appellant and Mary Holloway (T. 239). 
The apartment is located at 269 Kelsey Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (T. 72). In this interim period disagreements erupted 
between the victim, the appellant anB Mary Holloway, which 
were apparently rooted in the treatment the victim had 
accorded a mutual friend (T. 123, 124). 
During the evening of March 14, 1981, Mary Holloway, 
the appellant, the victim, and Tommy Garcia, an acquaintance 
of the others, were in the apartment drinking alcoholic 
beverages (T. 241). The alcohol-induced cordiality of the 
evening rapidly deteriorated when Garcia and the appellant 
engaged the victim in heated argument (T. 274, 275, 243). The 
victim was then viciously attacked by the others. The 
appellant choked the victim, leaving him almost unconscious 
(T. 134). With the victim virtua\•Y helpless, Mary Holloway 
grabbed his head and told him to plead for his life, whereupon 
the appellant smashed glass beer mugs over the victim's head. 
The appellant then bludgeoned the victim's head with bars of 
teak wood (T. 156). Following the beating, a knife was 
produced, and appellant, Holloway and Garcia each took turns 
stabbing the victim, inflicting fifteen separate wounds, each 
wound seven to eight inches deep (T. 157, 196, 199). 
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Following the murder, the victim's body was placed 
in the back seat of a car; and with appellant at the wheel and 
Holloway and Garcia as passengers, the body was transported to 
1400 East Sunnyside Avenue (T. 3, 158). As Garcia removed the 
body from the car and placed it by a sidewalk near the road, 
he was seen by passing motorist Ryan Nielsen, a University of 
Utah police officer who had finished his night shift at 2:00 
a.m. on March 15, 1981 (T. 33, 34, 2~4, 3, 5). Officer 
Nielsen then followed the car as it headed westbound on 800 
South (T. 5). Apparently malfunctioning, appellant's car 
stopped at 500 East and 800 South (T. 6). Officer Nielsen 
approached the car, identified himself and told the occupants 
to lie on the ground (T. 7). All three complied with the 
order, but moments later Garcia jumped up and ran from the car 
(T. 7). Officer Nielsen told appellant and Holloway that they 
wer~ under arrest and they were to stay on the ground, and he 
then pursued Garcia, apprehending him minutes later (T. 8). 
In the meantime, however, appellant and Holloway fled on foot, 
returning to their apartment (T. si. 
\1 
Following further police investigation, Holloway and 
appellant were both arrested on March 23, 1981 (T. 70). 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION 
ON MANSLAUGHTER. 
Essentially, appellant argues that evidence in the 
record supports a reasonable view that his conduct lies within 
the ambit of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-205 (1973), as amended, 
the manslaughter statute, and that the lower court's failure 
to issue the requested manslaughter instruction constitutes 
reversible error. Scrutiny of the trial record, however, 
belies appellant's claim. 
states: 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-402(4) (1973), as amended, 
The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. 
In construing Utah Code Ann., § 77-33-6 (1953), as amended, 
the predecessor to S 76-1-402(4), this Court stated: 
# 
When an appellant makes iin issue of a 
refusal to instruct on included offenses, 
we will survey the evidence, and the 
inferences which admit of rational 
deduction, to determine if there exists 
reasonable basis upon which a conviction 
of the lesser offense could rest. 
-4-
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State v. Dougherty, Utah, 550 P.2d 175, 176 (1976). From 
Dougherty it necessarily follows that if no evidence of an 
included offense is presented at trial, the defendant is not 
entitled to a jury instruction covering the included offense. 
See Boggess v. State, Utah, No. 17983 (decided September 13, 
1982): State v. Chesnut, Utah, 621 P.2d 1228 (1980). 
In Dougherty, supra, appellant was convicted of 
unlawful distribution for value of a:controlled substance. He 
appealed his conviction contending that the lower court erred 
in refusing to give an instruction on the included offense of 
possession of a controlled substance. In reviewing the trial 
record,~this Court found that the evidence presented at trial 
either supported appellant's guilt for the greater offense or 
established his innocence. Affirming appellant's conviction, 
this Court held that where "the defendant denies any 
complicity in the crime charged, and thus lays no foundation 
for any intermediate verdict," he is not entitled to a jury 
/ 
instruction on the included offense. 550 P.2d at 176. 
The Kansas Supreme Cour\1 in State v. Burrow, 221 
Kan. 754, 561 P.2d 864 (1977), addressed the same issue raised 
in Dougherty on facts similar to those found in the instant 
case. There, the two appellants were convicted of second-
degree murder. Appellants' convictions were based in part on 
testimony provided by an accomplice testifying as a 
prosecution witness in return for a lesser charge. Appellants 
-5-
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testified that the accomplice was the murderer and that they 
had only attempted to intercede in the victim's behalf. 
Following conviction, the appellants appealed contending that 
the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on lesser 
included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary 
manslaughter. The Supreme Court found no evidence in the 
record justifying appellants' request for the manslaughter 
• 
instructions. Furthermore, the Court noted that appellants 
denied any involvement in the murder and in fact testified 
that the accomplice was the sole cause of the victim's death. 
Noting the inconsistency between appellants' testimony, in 
which they attempted to negate participation in any unlawful 
killing, and their request for manslaughter instructions, the 
Kansas Supreme Court held that the lower court properly 
refused to so instruct the jury. 
Applying the aforementioned case and statutory 
authority to the facts of the case at bar, appellant was 
simply not entitled to his requested manslaughter instruction. 
The record indicates that Mary Ho~oway, with appellant 
present, told another that •we hate Sam" (T. 116). In the 
same conversation she also said "But it's all right because we 
are going to kill him anyway" (T. 116). To these responses 
appellant said nothing, and he offered no protest (T. 117). 
In addition, the manner of the killing and the events 
immediately preceding cannot support a claim that the criminal 
-6-
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homicide was manslaughter. Following the murder and the 
disposal of the body, appellant recounted to two individuals 
the gruesome murder details (T. 130, et seq., 150, et seq.). 
Appellant states that he choked the victim almost to the point 
of unconsciousness, that he hit the victim in the head with 
glass beer mugs and bars of wood, and that he joined Garcia 
and Holloway in stabbing the victim to death (T. 134, 156, 
157). Furthermore, Dr. Guery Flores, a forensic pathologist, 
• 
testified that each of the fifteen wounds inflicted on the 
victim's body would be fatal (T. 199). Finally, the autopsy 
revealed that the victim was literally swimming in a sea of 
alcohol and narcotics. His blood contained .19 percent 
alcohol plus traces of phenobarbital barbiturate, a sedative, 
methadone, which causes drowsiness, flurazepam, a sedative 
used to induce sleep, and diazepam and nordiazepam, both 
sedatives (T. 202, 203). In this condition, the victim could 
not possibly have posed a threat to appellant and his two 
accomplices. 
For a criminal homicide ~o constitute m~nslaughter, 
\ 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-205(1) (1911), as amended, requires 
that the actor must: 
(a) recklessly [cause] the death of 
another; or 
{b) [Cause] the death of another under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or . excuse; 
-7-
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(c) [Cause] the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a moral 
or legal justification or extenuation for 
his conduct although the conduct is not 
legally justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances. 
Viewing the facts outlined above in light of S 76-5-205(1), 
there is no support for the claim that the criminal homicide 
was manslaughter. 
Finally, appellant's own trial testimony is wholly 
inconsistent with his request for a manslaughter instruction. 
Appellant testified that Garcia was the victim's murderer, and 
he only attempted to stop the fight but was knocked down by 
Garcia (T. 266). Appellant testified that the unconscious 
victim was then transported to 1400 East Sunnyside Avenue 
where the victim was removed from the car and repeatedly 
stabbed by Garcia while the appellant and Holloway remained in 
the car (T. 268, 270). Thus, appellant's defense, as 
evidenced by his testimony, is that he was not involved in any 
unlawful killing. Therefore, invoking Burrow and Dougherty, 
supra, appellant was not entitled ~o a manslaughter 
instruction. 
In sum, appellant has not met the test of Utah Code 
Ann., § 76-1-402(4) (1973), as amended, because he has failed 
to articulate facts of record evidencing a rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting him of second-degree murder and 
convicting him of manslaughter. Thus, his requested 
-8-
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manslaughter instruction was properly denied by the trial 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the aforementioned authorities and 
argument, respondent respectfully requests this Court aff irrn 
appellant's conviction and sentence. 
1982. 
Respectfully submitted thie 5th day of October, 
• 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney Gen;;~ ~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Stephen R. 
Mccaughey, Attorney for Appellant, 72 East 400 South, 1330, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 5th day of October, 1982. 
-l 
' 
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